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The Supreme Court’s Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence is inconsistent with the 
clause’s original meaning and fails to strike the proper balance among religious 
liberty claims, equal protection guarantees, and laws advancing important societal 
interests.1 The problem with the Court’s decisions is that they have afforded the 
highest level of constitutional protection for religious liberty regardless of the context 
within which it is exercised. In so doing, the Court has invalidated generally 
applicable laws that advance legitimate governmental objectives, do not target 
particular religions or religious practices, and merely prohibit, rather than compel, 
conduct that is not, in itself, religious in nature.   
This article proposes a paradigm for resolving disputes under the free exercise 
clause that is analogous to the framework used by the court under the Fourth 
Amendment when balancing privacy rights against investigatory powers of law 
enforcement. In its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the Court provides varying 
degrees of protection to privacy – and imposes different evidentiary requirements on 
law enforcement – depending on the context in which privacy is affected, the 
intrusiveness of a particular search, and the asserted governmental interests. For 
example, privacy receives the strongest protections in areas such as the home, thus 
requiring law enforcement to have probable cause and a warrant before conducting a 
search (unless an exception to the warrant requirement applies).2 In quasi-public 
spaces, such as a motor vehicle or a place of business, individuals have a reduced 
expectation of privacy that permits searches based on reasonable suspicion of 
 
       *   Assistant Professor of Law, Indiana Tech Law School. 
 1.  See U.S. CONST., amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the 
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances”). 
 2.  See Ben Lowry, Subjective Intent and the Police-Created Exigency Doctrine: The Lawlessness of the 
Lawfulness Test, 51 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 591, 598 (2013). For example, law enforcement does not need a 
warrant or probable cause when confronted with exigent circumstances, which one commentator describes as 
follows:  
[T]he Court has recognized that in certain “exigent circumstances,” the police may permissibly 
bypass the warrant requirement. Exigent circumstances have been defined as situations that present 
a “specially pressing or urgent law enforcement need,” or, alternatively, as “situations where ‘real 
immediate and serious consequences’ will ‘certainly occur’ if a police officer postpones action to 
obtain a warrant.” To date, the Court has recognized three sets of circumstances that are sufficiently 
“exigent” to excuse the police from having to obtain a warrant: (1) when police are in “hot pursuit” 
of a fleeing suspect, (2) when the safety of police officers or other persons would be jeopardized by 
delaying to obtain a warrant, and (3) when evidence is likely to be destroyed or otherwise removed. 
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unlawful conduct.3 In public spaces, such as open fields or sidewalks, citizens have 
little, if any, expectation of privacy, and law enforcement typically needs no 
suspicion whatsoever to observe objects that are placed in public view. The Table 
below summarizes the Court’s approach to balancing privacy rights against law 
enforcement’s investigatory powers.  
Table I 
The Standards for Resolving Fourth Amendment Disputes 
 
The Court should adopt a similar framework such that the strength of a free 
exercise claim could vary depending on where, when, and how it is exercised. 
Specifically, the validity of a law interfering with religious liberty would depend on 
whether it: 
 Affects religious practices or beliefs; 
 Prohibits or compels conduct; 
 Directly or indirectly targets religious practices or beliefs; 
 Applies in the public or private arena; and  
 Advances valid and secular governmental interests. 
 As the Table below demonstrates, this approach would result in protections for 
religious liberty that are categorical in some instances and context-specific in others.   
 
 
 3.  See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
Fourth Amendment Level of Protection Standard 
Private Space (e.g. 
private residences)  
Categorical/Near 
Absolute 
Probable cause and a 
warrant (absent one of 
the exceptions to the 
probable cause and 
warrant requirements) 
Quasi-Public Space (e.g. 
motor vehicles, schools, 
places of business, 
libraries) 
Context-Specific Reasonable Suspicion 
(no warrant required) 
Public Space (e.g., open 
fields, public sidewalks, 
items in plain view) 
Minimal No suspicion or warrant 
required 
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Table II 











Laws restricting religious practices or 
beliefs are presumptively invalid unless 
they further a compelling government 
interest and are the least restrictive 












A law is invalid unless it furthers a 
substantial governmental interest and is 
the least restrictive means available to 










Minimal  Laws are presumptively valid provided 
they do not target or disparately impact 
particular religions or religious 
practices 
 
Consequently, in the public and, to a slightly lesser extent, quasi-public arena, 
the right to freely exercise one’s religion would not permit citizens to avoid 
complying with valid laws that do not target particular religions or religious practices. 
This rule would apply to public and private businesses that provide services or 
commercial products to the public, corporations that receive federal funding, and 
organizations, such as libraries, that may restrict access or membership.  On the other 
hand, laws burdening religious practices in private areas would trigger the highest 
level of protection and require the government to satisfy strict scrutiny.4 This 
 
 4.  See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1273 (2007) (In modern 
constitutional law, the term “strict scrutiny” refers to a test under which statutes will be pronounced 
unconstitutional unless they are “necessary” or “narrowly tailored” to serve a 
“compelling governmental interest”).  See also Matthew D. Bunker, Clay Calvert, & William C. Nevin, Strict 
in Theory, But Feeble in Fact? First Amendment Strict Scrutiny and the Protection of Speech, 16 COMM. L. & 
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approach—based on the Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence—would be an 
effective method by which to strike the proper balance between citizens’ right to 
freely practice their religion and the government’s interest in regulating public 
conduct that affects the health, safety, and welfare of citizens. This includes the right 
to be free from discriminatory treatment on the basis of ethnicity and sexual 
orientation. 
Put simply, the Free Exercise Clause should be viewed in the broader context of 
promoting equality and liberty for all citizens. As discussed below, the Framers 
adopted the Clause to protect all forms of religious worship and to give citizens the 
liberty to practice their religious beliefs free from governmental coercion. The Free 
Exercise Clause does not, however, give citizens or businesses that offer goods and 
services to the general public the right to avoid complying with valid laws on 
religious grounds, particularly where those laws further the very equality that the Free 
Exercise Clause protects in religious contexts. This interpretation comports with the 
historical record and promotes liberty, autonomy, and equality on an individual and 
societal level. Part II discusses the original meaning and purpose of the Free Exercise 
Clause as evidenced by the drafting process and eventual adoption in the First 
Congress. Part III examines the Court’s free exercise case law over the last century 
and concludes that it has resulted in over-protecting religious freedom and under-
valuing the important governmental interests underlying many generally applicable 
laws. Part IV concludes that the tiered framework used in the Fourth Amendment 
context to balance privacy rights against the needs of law enforcement should be 
adopted to determine the strength of a free exercise claim in light of countervailing 
governmental interests.   
II. THE ORIGINAL MEANING OF THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE – THE FIRST 
CONGRESS REJECTED THE IDEA THAT CITIZENS SHOULD RECEIVE 
EXEMPTIONS FROM GENERALLY APPLICABLE LAWS BASED ON RELIGIOUS 
BELIEF 
 The Free Exercise Clause provides that “Congress shall make no law respecting 
an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”5 The historical 
record reveals that the drafters of the did not intend for it to grant individuals a right 
to be exempt from such laws, but instead to prevent the government from 
discriminating against or disfavoring particular religions or religious practices.  
A. Free Exercise and Freedom of Conscience 
On one level, “[t]he record of the drafting of the Free Exercise Clause reads like 
a markup session, the focus of which was to craft text that was not redundant or 
stylistically awkward.”6 On another level, the First Congress’s substantive 
deliberations reveal the Clause’s intended meaning. In the early stages of the drafting 
 
POL’Y 349, 356-57 (2006). 
 5.  See, U.S. CONST., amend. 1. 
 6.  Vincent Phillip Munoz, The Original Meaning of the Free Exercise Clause: The Evidence from the 
First Congress, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1083, 1109 (2008). 
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process, James Madison proposed two amendments directed at protecting freedom of 
religion and conscience. The first, which was directed at the federal government, 
provided that “[t]he civil rights of none shall be abridged on account of religious 
belief or worship, nor shall any national religion be established nor shall the full and 
equal rights of conscience be in any manner, or on any pretext, infringed.”7 The 
second was directed at the states and stated that “[n]o State shall violate the equal 
rights of conscience, or the freedom of the press, or the trial by jury in criminal case.”8 
Subsequent revisions retained language prohibiting the establishment of religion, 
guaranteeing the free exercise of religion, and protecting equal rights of conscience.9 
This suggests that the First Congress contemplated an exemption for citizens who 
objected to a law on the grounds that it violated their religious beliefs.10  
However, later revisions eliminated any language referring to “equal rights of 
conscience,”11 and the penultimate revision stated as follows:  
Congress shall make no law establishing articles of faith or a mode of 
worship, or prohibiting the free exercise of religion, or abridging the 
freedom of speech, or the press, or the right of the people peaceably to 
assemble, and petition to the government for the redress of grievances.12 
Admittedly, even though “no member of Congress articulated what he 
understood by the phrases ‘free exercise’ or ‘rights of conscience,’13 the 
elimination of the latter phrases, from the Clause indicates that it was not 
considered a part of the free exercise of religion: 
[S]ome members of the House might have thought that these two phrases 
denoted different types of protection, because they included both phrases 
in their versions of the amendment. If so, the record does not include their 
explanations of what the differences were. And if such differences did 
exist, the Senate may have made the point moot by quickly eliminating the 
text “rights of conscience.” 14 
The evolution of what became the Free Exercise Clause suggests that the First 
Congress neither intended nor expected that a right of conscience would be 
encompassed within the broader right to freely exercise one’s religion. As one scholar 
explains, the First Congress’s deliberations and the final version of the free exercise 
clause “strongly suggest[s] that the First Congress did not understand 
the Free Exercise Clause to include a right to religious exemptions from generally 
 
 7.   Id. at 1102-1103. 
 8.  Id. at 1103. 
 9.  Id. 
 10.  Id. at 1106-07. 
 11.  Id. 
 12.  Id. at 1108. 
 13.  Id. at 1109. 
 14.  Id.  
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applicable laws.”15 This Second Amendment’s drafting and adoption underscores 
this point.  
B. The Second Amendment’s Adoption Clarifies the Meaning of the Free 
Exercise Clause  
In its initial versions, the Second Amendment exempted religious, or 
conscientious, objectors from military service.16 A proposed amendment provided 
that “right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed; a well-armed 
and well-regulated militia being the best security of a free country: but no person 
religiously scrupulous of bearing arms shall be compelled to render military service 
in person.”17 A subsequent amendment qualified this exemption, with one stating 
“any person religiously scrupulous of bearing arms ought to be exempted, upon 
payment of an equivalent to employ another to bear arms in his stead.”18 
The ensuing debate among members of Congress confirms that the conscientious 
objector provision was limited in scope. One member argued that it gave the 
government “discretionary power to “‘declare who are those religiously scrupulous, 
and prevent them from bearing arms.’”19  The shift against a conscientious objector 
provision solidified when Representative Egbert Benson moved to eliminate the 
conscientious objector provision entirely, stating as follows: 
No man can claim this indulgence of right. It may be a religious 
persuasion, but it is no natural right, and therefore ought to be left to the 
discretion of the Government. If this stands part of the constitution, it will 
be a question before the Judiciary on every regulation you make with 
respect to the organization of the militia, whether it comports with this 
declaration or not. It is extremely injudicious to intermix matters of doubt 
with fundamentals.20 
Benson believed that the conscientious objector provision was not “part of the 
natural right to religious liberty.”21 Instead, Benson believed that “the rights of 
conscience could … be balanced against other competing governmental 
interests,”22 and that the judiciary and legislative branches would “always possess 
humanity enough to indulge this class of citizens in a matter they are so desirous 
of.”23 
Some members of the House disagreed with Benson’s position, and the division 
over the conscientious objector provision resulted in a compromise amendment 
 
 15.  Id. at 1009-10. 
 16.  Id. at 1110. 
 17.  Id. 
 18.  Id. at 1111. 
 19.  Id. at 1112. 
 20.  Id. at  1113. 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  Id. at 1114. 
 23.  Id. at 1113-14. 
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stating that “no person religiously scrupulous shall be compelled to bear arms in 
person.”24 The words “in person” indicate that the state could impose 
alternative obligations on citizens who received exemptions from 
particular laws on religious grounds: 
[M]any of those who opposed bearing arms were equally scrupulous of 
getting substitutes or paying an equivalent. If religious individuals were 
understood to possess a right not to serve in the military on account of 
conscientious objection, then for the same reason they also would seem to 
possess an equal right not to pay for an equivalent. The reinsertion of “in 
person” suggests that the House understood conscientious objection not to 
override a citizen's civil obligations. Stated differently, “‘in person’” 
indicates that the House thought the state legitimately could demand some 
actions that burdened religious individuals' consciences. By restoring the 
words “‘in person,’” the House rejected Boudinot's hope that they ‘show 
the world that proper care is taken that the Government may not interfere 
with the religious sentiments of any person.’25 
This discussion was rendered moot in September of 1789 when the First 
Congress struck the conscientious objector provision altogether, which supports the 
proposition that “Congress as a whole considered and rejected a constitutional right 
to exemption based on religion.”26 Indeed, “[t]he concurrent but separate discussions 
over exemptions from military service on the one hand, and religious free exercise 
on the other, suggest that the House did not understand religious free exercise to 
include exemptions from generally applicable laws.”27  
To be sure, the meaning of the Free Exercise Clause must be understood in light 
of the Establishment Clause, which prohibits the government from endorsing or 
preferring a particular religion or from favoring religion over non-religion.28 The 
Establishment Clause speaks to the relationship between government and its citizens, 
and reflects the principle that a government-sponsored religion would devalue and 
implicitly discourage alternative religious beliefs (or practices).29 In this way, the 
 
 24.  Id. at 1115 (emphasis added). 
 25.  Id. at 1115-16 (internal citation omitted) (emphasis added). 
 26.  Id. at 1117 (stating that “Congress did not consider exemption from a generally applicable legal duty 
to be necessary to protect religious freedom”). 
 27.  Id. In addition, “states whose majorities proposed a conscientious objector amendment (Virginia, 
North Carolina, and Rhode Island) also proposed an amendment that ‘all men have an equal, natural, and 
inalienable right to the free exercise of religion, according to the dictates of conscience.” If these states believed 
that free exercise of religion incorporated a conscientious objector provision, a separate amendment would have 
been unnecessary. The drafters of the Free Exercise Clause did not likely intend for it to encompass a right “to 
be exempt from civic obligations on account of their incompatibility with an individual’s religious beliefs.” Id. 
 28.  See U.S. CONST., amend. I. 
 29.  See James A. Campbell, Newdow Calls for a New Day in Establishment Clause Jurisprudence: 
Justice Thomas’s ‘Actual Legal Coercion’ Standard Provides the Necessary Renovation, 39 AKRON L. REV. 
541, 550 (2011). The Founders intended primarily for the Establishment Clause to prevent the federal 
government from establishing a national religion:  
The heart of the Establishment Clause, as expressed by its drafter James Madison, is that the 
government “should not establish a religion and enforce the legal observation of it by law.” The 
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Establishment Clause creates a climate free of coercion to enable citizens to express 
their religious beliefs without the fear of being marginalized or punished.30 
At the same time, neither the Constitution’s text nor the deliberations in the First 
Congress suggest that the right to freely exercise one’s religion permits citizens to 
avoid complying with generally applicable laws that further legitimate governmental 
objectives. It certainly does not support the proposition that the government is 
forbidden from requiring all citizens to comply with valid laws in the public forum 
regardless of their religious beliefs. 
 Such an interpretation would allow the Free Exercise Clause to be a vehicle for 
the type of discrimination that, when applied to religious beliefs, it was designed to 
prohibit. For example, the state of Indiana’s recently passed Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act (“RFRA”) could be interpreted to give corporations offering services 
the general public, the right to deny service to groups of citizens, such as same-sex 
couples and Muslims, based on religious belief.31 This perverts the original purpose 
underlying the Free Exercise Clause, which was to protect citizens from the coercive 
powers of government, not to give citizens that authority to do under the guise of 
religion what the government cannot do to them. Indeed, given the original purpose 
underlying the Free Exercise Clause, corporations that discriminate against same-sex 
couples cannot possibly claim that the government – through anti-discrimination laws 
or otherwise –is infringing on their free exercise rights, just as individuals who 
scream “fire” in a crowded theater cannot claim that the government is infringing on 
their free speech rights.32 Rights have limits because liberty is both an individual and 
collective good.  
Additionally, business owners who would refuse services to consumers on the 
basis of sexual orientation or ethnicity are not actually practicing their religion. They 
are providing products and products to citizens in the public arena, where government 
has a powerful interest in ensuring equality and non-discriminatory treatment. 
 
Framers’ primary goal in adopting the Establishment Clause was to prevent the oppression 
associated with a government-established church. Such persecution and maltreatment included 
mandatory church attendance, taxation for the direct support of a particular religious sect, and 
punishment of nonbelievers. Inherent in these problems was the government’s use of actual legal 
force, or threat of force, to uphold the power of the established church. Id. (internal citation omitted). 
 30. See id. at 545-46. One commentator explains as follows:  
The history and context of the Founding Era are fundamental in evaluating the meaning of the 
Establishment Clause. America was founded by refugees escaping Europe’s tyrannical religious 
climate. However, the religious persecution did not end when the colonists reached the New 
World. Because the British continued to exercise religious dominion over the colonists through the 
authority of the Church of England, the colonists faced continuing oppression once they settled in 
America. This religious persecution, at least in part, contributed to the American Revolution. Such 
turbulent circumstances illustrate why the Framers were hesitant to address “the subject 
of religion for fear that the discussion might lead to some form of federal ecclesiastical 
establishment” similar to the Church of England. 
 31.  See Garret Epps, THE ATLANTIC, What Makes Indiana’s Religious Freedom Law Different?  (Mar. 
30, 2015), available at http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/03/what-makes-indianas-religious-
freedom-law-different/388997/. 
 32.  See, e.g., Jessica Ronay, Adults Post the Darndest Things: [Ctrl + Shift] Freedom of Speech [Esc] 
Our Past, 46 U. TOL. L. REV. 73, 74 (2014) (stating, “[j]ust as courts have held that crying ”fire” in 
a crowded theater is not protected speech, the new world of revenge porn and mug shot profiteering may require 
similar limitations on speech protected by the First Amendment”). 
 
2016] Journal of Legislation 139 
Notwithstanding, even if serving a same-sex couple or a Muslim interfered with a 
corporation’s religious beliefs, the interference would be justifiable. In no way does 
a law prohibiting such discrimination interfere with the corporation’s ability to 
believe whatever it chooses and to practice those beliefs in a number of private and 
public settings, such as in a church or on a public street. Moreover, just like the 
individual who chooses to drive on a public road or place items in an open field, 
citizens who make the decision to serve the public should not expect that their 
religious beliefs will have the same constitutional protections as they would in a 
church or synagogue. Of course, this is not to say that business owners’ free exercise 
rights vanish when they decide to open a business. It is to say that the government 
and societal interest in providing equal treatment and liberty for all citizens should 
not be trumped by those who voluntarily holds themselves out to the public as 
providers of goods and services, and who would use their religious beliefs to engage 
in discriminatory conduct.  
Of course, conscientious objections to valid laws can sometimes be permissible, 
but they should be the exception, not the rule, and function to guarantee a citizen’s 
private right to practice his or her religion. For example, parents should not be 
required to send their children to public high schools if they have a long-standing 
religious tradition of homeschooling,33 because in this context the government is 
compelling parents to violate deeply held religious beliefs in a decidedly private 
realm.  
Ultimately, the differences between in exercising religion in the private versus 
public sphere, between laws that target religious practices or apply equally to all 
citizens, and between laws compelling as opposed to prohibiting conduct, are among 
of several factors that the Court should consider to determine the strength of the free 
exercise right. Generally speaking, absent a compelling government interest, in 
private areas the government should not be permitted to compel or prohibit conduct 
that infringes on religious beliefs or practices.34 Additionally, laws that target or 
disproportionately affect specific religions will almost always be invalid.35 
Conversely, in public and quasi-public areas where goods or services are offered to 
the general public, protections for religious liberty should be reduced, absent a 
showing that the law constitutes an extraordinary burden on religious beliefs. In this 
context, such a claim is furthest removed from the meaning and purpose of the Free 
Exercise Clause.   
Applying this framework, the government would not be able to compel a church 
to marry same-sex couples, but it may require a judicial officer to perform civil same-
sex marriages even if those marriages infringe on the officer’s religious beliefs. 
Similarly, as established by the Court in Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. Hialeah,36 
the government may not prohibit a religious group from sacrificing an animal in its 
 
 33.  See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (holding that Wisconsin’s compulsory education law 
violated the free exercise clause as applied to an Amish family). 
 34.  See Church of Babalu Aye v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993) (holding that a law prohibiting ritual animal 
sacrifice violated the free exercise rights of church members who practices animal sacrifice in connection with 
their faith). 
 35.  See Fallon, Jr., supra note 4, at 1272. 
 36.  Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 520. 
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place of worship, but it would certainly be able to prohibit this practice during the 
middle of the day on a busy street. Laws requiring judicial officers to perform civil 
marriages, and those regulating the time and place of animal slaughter may interfere 
with religious beliefs, but neither law can be viewed as targeting or disfavoring 
particular religions (or religious practices), or as advancing interests that favor some 
religions over others (or religion over non-religion). Of course, the law directed at 
judicial officers is compulsory, but it applies to the officer in his or her public role, 
and it treats all officers equally regardless of religious belief. Put simply, to achieve 
equality in public life citizens must be treated primarily as secular beings. 
Admittedly, laws that prohibit conduct are indirectly or implicitly compulsive, and 
the line between laws affecting religious practices as opposed to belief is blurry. 
Instead of trying to make artificial distinctions between practices and beliefs, the 
Court should base its distinctions on time, place, and effect. As discussed below, for 
a substantial period in its history, the Supreme Court adopted a similar approach in 
free exercise cases, but in recent years the Court has taken a broader view that has 
divorced the Free Exercise Clause from its historical underpinnings.  
III. THE SUPREME COURT’S FREE EXERCISE JURISPRUDENCE IN LIGHT OF THE 
HISTORY AND MEANING OF THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE 
A. Reynolds v. United States – Rejecting a Conscientious Objector 
Exception  
In Reynolds v. United States37 the Court held that laws criminalizing polygamy 
did not infringe on the free exercise of religion.38 In so holding, the Court refused to 
exempt individuals who claimed that their religious beliefs sanctioned polygamous 
relationships, holding that “[l]aws are made for the government of actions, and while 
they cannot interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they may with 
practices.”39 
The Court’s decision not only distinguishes between religious beliefs and 
practices, but it recognizes that law may interfere with religious beliefs. As the Court 
stated, the Free Exercise Clause is not intended to make “the professed doctrines of 
religious belief superior to the law of the land, and in effect to permit every citizen to 
become a law unto himself.”40 In such a circumstance, the government could exist 
“in name only.”41 
 
 37.  Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). 
 38.  Id. at 167. 
 39.  Id. at 166 (emphasis added). The Court reasoned as follows:  
Suppose one believed that human sacrifices were a necessary part of religious worship, would it be 
seriously contended that the civil government under which he lived could not interfere to prevent a 
sacrifice? Or if a wife religiously believed it was her duty to burn herself upon the funeral pile of 
her dead husband, would it be beyond the power of the civil government to prevent her carrying her 
belief into practice? 
 40.  Id. at 166-67. 
 41.  Id. (stating that “[i]t matters not that his belief was a part of his professed religion: it was still belief, 
and belief only”). 
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B. United States v Ballard – The Veracity of an Individual’s Religious 
Beliefs is Irrelevant 
In United States v. Ballard,42 the Court held that juries may not make qualitative 
judgments concerning a defendant’s religious beliefs.43  If juries (or courts) were 
permitted to do so, the right to freely exercise one’s religion would mean little, if 
anything: 
Religious experiences which are as real as life to some may be 
incomprehensible to others. Yet the fact that they may be beyond the ken 
of mortals does not mean that they can be made suspect before the law . . . 
[i]f one could be sent to jail because a jury in a hostile environment found 
those teachings false, little indeed would be left of religious freedom. The 
Fathers of the Constitution were not unaware of the varied and extreme 
views of religious sects, of the violence of disagreement among them, and 
of the lack of any one religious creed on which all men would agree. They 
fashioned a charter of government which envisaged the widest possible 
toleration of conflicting views. Man’s relation to his God was made no 
concern of the state. He was granted the right to worship as he pleased and 
to answer to no man for the verity of his religious views. The religious 
views espoused by respondents might seem incredible, if not preposterous, 
to most people. But if those doctrines are subject to trial before a jury 
charged with finding their truth or falsity, then the same can be done with 
the religious beliefs of any sect.44 
Indeed, the Free Exercise Clause not only “forestalls compulsion by law of the 
acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of worship,”45 but also 
“safeguards the free exercise of the chosen form of religion.”46   
 
 42.  United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944). 
 43. Id. at 86-87. 
 44.  Id. (explaining that “[t]he law knows no heresy, and is committed to the support of no dogma, the 
establishment of no sect”) (quoting Cantwell, 10 U.S. at 303 (1940)). 
 45.  Cantwell, 10 U.S. at 303. 
 46.  Id.; see also Frazee v. Ill. Security Dep’t, 489 U.S. 829 (1989).  In Frazee  the Court invalidated an 
Illinois law that denied unemployment benefits to worker who rejected a job offer because job would have 
required him to work on Sunday. The Court held that the free exercise clause prohibits the government from 
examining the underlying merits of an individual’s free exercise claim:  
Our judgments in those cases rested on the fact that each of the claimants had a sincere belief that 
religion required him or her to refrain from the work in question. Never did we suggest that unless 
a claimant belongs to a sect that forbids what his job requires, his belief, however sincere, must be 
deemed a purely personal preference rather than a religious belief. Indeed, in Thomas, there was 
disagreement among sect members as to whether their religion made it sinful to work in an 
armaments factory; but we considered this to be an irrelevant issue and hence rejected the State’s 
submission that unless the religion involved formally forbade work on armaments, Thomas’ belief 
did not qualify as a religious belief. Because Thomas unquestionably had a sincere belief that his 
religion prevented him from doing such work, he was entitled to invoke the protection of the Free 
Exercise Clause (citing Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Security Div., 450 U.S. 707 
(1981); Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n of Florida, 480 U.S. 136 (1987)). 
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C. Cantwell v. Connecticut –Religious Practices are not Given the Same 
Protections as Religious Beliefs 
 In Cantwell v. Connecticut,47 the Court invalidated a statute that prohibited 
citizens from soliciting money for a religious, charitable, or philanthropic purpose.48 
Although the “freedom to adhere to such religious organization or form of worship 
as the individual may choose cannot be restricted by law,”49 the Court again 
distinguished between religious beliefs and practices, holding that “[t]he first is 
absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be.”50  
 Accordingly, a state may “by general and non-discriminatory legislation 
regulate the times, the places, and the manner of soliciting upon its streets, and . . . 
may in other respects safeguard the peace, good order and comfort of the community, 
without unconstitutionally invading the liberties protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”51 The Court explained as follows: 
Even the exercise of religion may be at some slight inconvenience in order 
that the state may protect its citizens from injury. Without doubt a state 
may protect its citizens from fraudulent solicitation by requiring a stranger 
in the community, before permitting him publicly to solicit funds for any 
purpose, to establish his identity and his authority to act for the cause 
which he purports to represent.8 The state is likewise free to regulate the 
time and manner of solicitation generally, in the interest of public safety, 
peace, comfort or convenience.52 
The majority in Cantwell rejected the argument that the law at issue applied 
equally to all citizens, as it conditioned the right to solicit upon a state official’s 
determination of whether a cause was “religious.”53 Thus, while “[c]onduct remains 
subject to regulation for the protection of society,”54 laws cannot target or single out 
religion for disparate treatment.   
D. Sherbert v. Verner– Laws  Compelling Conduct and 
Disproportionately Burdening Religion are Invalid 
In Sherbert v. Verner,55 the Court made it more difficult for the government to 
 
 47.  Cantwell, 10 U.S. at 296. 
 48.  Id. at 307.  In Cantwell, the Court incorporated the free exercise clause to the states through the 
Fourteenth Amendment, holding that the “fundamental concept of liberty embodied in that Amendment 
embraces the liberties guaranteed by the First Amendment.” Id. at 303. 
 49.  Id. at 303-04. 
 50.  Id. 
 51.  Id. at 304. 
 52.  Id. at 306-07. 
 53.  Id. (holding that, “to condition the solicitation of aid for the perpetuation of religious views or systems 
upon a license, the grant of which rests in the exercise of a determination by state authority as to what is a 
religious cause, is to . . . burden . . . the exercise of liberty protected by the Constitution”). 
 54.  Id. 
 55.  374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
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enforce generally applicable laws against religious objectors. The petitioner a 
member of the Seventh - day Adventist church, did not work on Saturdays, which her 
church considered a day of rest.56 When the petitioner’s employer switched from a 
five to six-day workweek, petitioner refused to work on Saturdays and was fired.57 
The state subsequently denied employment benefits, and petitioner sued.58 The 
Connecticut Supreme Court upheld the decision, but the Court, in a 7-2 decision, 
reversed.59 
Writing for the majority, Justice Brennan began by acknowledging that the Court 
had upheld laws regulating conduct “prompted by religious beliefs or principles, for 
‘even when the action is in accord with one’s religious convictions, [it] is not totally 
free from legislative restrictions.’”60 However, the circumstances in which the Court 
has permitted laws to infringe on religious liberty typically involve “some substantial 
threat to public safety, peace or order.”61 Likewise, the state may not “penalize or 
discriminate against individuals or groups because they hold religious views 
abhorrent to the authorities.”62 Consequently, “‘[i]f the purpose or effect of a law is 
to impede the observance of one or all religions or is to discriminate invidiously 
between religions, that law is constitutionally invalid even though the burden may be 
characterized as being only indirect.’”63   
The most striking aspect in Sherbert was the requirement that laws 
causing only an “incidental burden on the free exercise of . . . religion may be 
justified by a ‘compelling state interest in the regulation of a subject within the State’s 
constitutional power to regulate.’”64 Applying this standard, the Court held that the 
state’s asserted interest did not outweigh the substantial burden on the employee’s 
religion: 65 
 
 56.  Id. at 399. 
 57.  Id. 
 58.  Id. at 401. 
 59.  Id. at 402. 
 60.  Id. at 403 (quoting Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 603 (1961)). 
 61.  Id. (citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 
(1905); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (holding  that a mother could be prosecuted under a state’s 
child labor laws for using her children to distribute literature in the streets); Cleveland v. United States, 329 
U.S. 14 (1946); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961);  Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67 (1953)). 
 62.  Id. at 402. 
 63.  Id. at 404 (quoting Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 607). 
 64.  Id. at 402-03 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963)).  
 65.  Id. at 407.  The Court held that the state’s justification for the la—to prevent the filing of fraudulent 
claims—was not sufficiently compelling:  
The appellees suggest no more than a possibility that the filing of fraudulent claims by unscrupulous 
claimants feigning religious objections to Saturday work might not only dilute the unemployment 
compensation fund but also hinder the scheduling by employers of necessary Saturday work. But 
that possibility is not apposite here because no such objection appears to have been made before the 
South Carolina Supreme Court, and we are unwilling to assess the importance of an asserted state 
interest without the views of the state court. Nor, if the contention had been made below, would the 
record appear to sustain it; there is no proof whatever to warrant such fears of malingering or deceit 
as those which the respondents now advance. Even if consideration of such evidence is not 
foreclosed by the prohibition against judicial inquiry into the truth or falsity of religious beliefs . . .  
a question as to which we intimate no view since it is not before us—it is highly doubtful whether 
such evidence would be sufficient to warrant a substantial infringement of religious liberties. 
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Here not only is it apparent that appellant’s declared ineligibility for 
benefits derives solely from the practice of her religion, but the pressure 
upon her to forego that practice is unmistakable. The ruling forces her to 
choose between following the precepts of her religion and forfeiting 
benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of her 
religion in order to accept work, on the other 
hand. Governmental imposition of such a choice puts the same kind of 
burden upon the free exercise of religion as would a fine imposed 
against appellant for her Saturday worship.66 
Echoing the Court’s holding in Cantwell, Just Brennan stated that “to condition 
the availability of benefits upon this appellant’s willingness to violate a 
cardinal principle of her religious faith effectively penalizes the free exercise of 
her constitutional liberties.”67 To make matters worse, the law, by intent or effect, 
targeted Seventh-Day Adventists, as South Carolina “expressly saves the Sunday 
worshipper from having to make the kind of choice which we here hold infringes the 
Sabbatarian’s religious liberty.”68 As a practical matter, therefore, the law 
substantially burdened, and had a disparate impact upon, the petitioner’s religion. 
E. Wisconsin v. Yoder—Affirming the Principle that Compelled Conduct 
Enhances The Severity of the Burden on Religion  
 In Wisconsin v. Yoder,69 an Amish family challenged a statute requiring all 
children to attend public schools until the age of sixteen.70 The family argued, among 
other things, that the law interfered with basic tenets of their religion, which focused 
on “informal learning-through-doing; a life of ‘goodness,’ rather than a life of 
intellect; wisdom, rather than technical knowledge, community welfare, rather than 
competition; and separation from, rather than integration with, contemporary worldly 
society.”71 
The Court agreed, holding that the compulsory education law materially 
interfered with the Amish family’s their values and customs.72 As the Court 
explained, “[t]he impact of the compulsory-attendance law on respondents’ 
practice . . .  is not only severe, but inescapable, for the Wisconsin law affirmatively 
compels them, under threat of criminal sanction, to perform acts undeniably at odds 
 
 66.  Id. at 404. 
 67.  Id. at 406. 
 68.  Id. 
 69.  Wisconsin, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
 70.  Id. at 207. 
 71.  Id. at 211. 
 72.  Id. at 219 (noting that “the unchallenged testimony of acknowledged experts . . . almost 300 years of 
consistent practice, and strong evidence of a sustained faith pervading and regulating respondents’ entire mode 
of life support the claim that enforcement of the State’s requirement of compulsory formal education after the 
eighth grade would gravely endanger if not destroy the free exercise of respondents’ religious beliefs”). 
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with fundamental tenets of their religious beliefs.”73  The Court highlighted the 
unique nature of the Amish way of life, which emphasized simplicity and 
an agrarian lifestyle:  
A related feature of Old Order Amish communities is their devotion to a 
life in harmony with nature and the soil, as exemplified by the simple life 
of the early Christian era that continued in America during much of our 
early national life. Amish beliefs require members of the community to 
make their living by farming or closely related activities. Broadly 
speaking, the Old Order Amish religion pervades and determines the entire 
mode of life of its adherents . . . Amish objection to formal education 
beyond the eighth grade is firmly grounded in these central religious 
concepts. They object to the high school, and higher education generally, 
because the values they teach are in marked variance with Amish values 
and the Amish way of life; they view secondary school education as an 
impermissible exposure of their children to a “worldy” influence in 
conflict with their beliefs. The high school tends to emphasize intellectual 
and scientific accomplishments, self-distinction, competitiveness, worldly 
success, and social life with other students.74 
Based on these principles, the Court rejected the state’s contention that the law 
was valid because it applied to all citizens, holding that facially neutral laws may 
nonetheless disproportionately burden particular religions and therefore violate the 
Free Exercise Clause.”75 
F. Goldman v. Weinberger – Context Matters in assessing the Strength of 
a Free Exercise Claim 
In Goldman v. Weinberger,76 the Court acknowledged the role of context in 
upholding a military regulation that prevented members of the Jewish faith from 
wearing a yarmulke.77 The Court began by explaining that its review of military 
 
 73.  Id. at 218. 
 74.  Id. at 210-11. The Court emphasized that the law offended a core component of the free exercise clause 
because it forced the Amish to conform to a way of life that directly contradicted their religious belief:  
Nor is the impact of the compulsory-attendance law confined to grave interference with important 
Amish religious tenets from a subjective point of view. It carries with it precisely the kind of 
objective danger to the free exercise of religion that the First Amendment was designed to prevent. 
As the record shows, compulsory school attendance to age 16 for Amish children carries with it a 
very real threat of undermining the Amish community and religious practice as they exist today; 
they must either abandon belief and be assimilated into society at large, or be forced to migrate to 
some other and more tolerant region. Id. at 218. 
 75.  Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 565 (Souter, J., concurring) (quoting Thomas, 450 U.S. at 
717) 
(quoting Yoder, 406 U.S. at 220) (noting that “a regulation neutral on its face may, in its application, nonetheless 
offend the constitutional requirement for governmental neutrality if it unduly burdens 
the free exercise of religion”). 
 76.  475 U.S. 503 (1986). 
 77.  Id. at 504. 
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regulations “is far more deferential than constitutional review of similar laws . . .  
designed for civilian society,” as the military “need not encourage debate or tolerate 
protest to the extent . . .  required of the civilian state by the First Amendment.”78 
Specifically, military service requires “the subordination of the desires and interests 
of the individual to the needs of the service,”79 which includes conforming to military 
rules and promoting unity among service members. Although the Court’s holding 
was limited to the military, it stands, at least in part, for the proposition that the 
strength of a Free Exercise Clause claim depends on the context in which it is 
asserted, and on the competing governmental interests. 
G. Lyng v. Northwest Cemetery Prot. Ass’n – The Government’s Burden 
is Reduced When Laws Interfere with Religious Practices on Public 
Lands 
In Lyng v. Northwest Cemetery Protestors’ Association,80 Court upheld a state 
law that permitted timber harvesting and road construction in areas of a national 
forest that were used for religious purposes by Indiana tribes.81 The Court afforded 
less weight to the free exercise claim in part because the tribes were not “coerced by 
the Government’s action into violating their religious beliefs,” and the law did not 
“penalize religious activity by denying any person an equal share of the rights, 
benefits, and privileges enjoyed by other citizens.”82  
Furthermore, and in sharp contrast to Sherbert, the Court was not swayed by the 
fact that “the challenged Government action would interfere significantly with 
private persons’ ability to pursue spiritual fulfillment according to their own religious 
beliefs.”83 Although “indirect coercion or penalties on the free exercise of 
religion . . .  are subject to scrutiny,” laws that “may make it more difficult to practice 
certain religions but which have no tendency to coerce individuals into acting 
contrary to their religious beliefs,” do not require a compelling state interest for 
“otherwise lawful actions.”84 The Court explained as follows: 
The Free Exercise Clause simply cannot be understood to require the 
Government to conduct its own internal affairs in ways that comport with 
the religious beliefs of particular citizens . . . The Free Exercise Clause 
affords an individual protection from certain forms of governmental 
compulsion; it does not afford an individual a right to dictate the conduct 
of the Government’s internal procedures.85 
 
 78.  Id. at 507 (citing Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S., 296, 300 (1983); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 843–
844  (1976) (Powell, J.,  concurring); Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 744 (1974)). 
 79.  Id. 
 80.  485 U.S. 439 (1988). 
 81.  Id. at 442. 
 82.  Id. at 449. 
 83.  Id. 
 84.  Id. at 450-51. 
 85.  Id. (quoting Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 699-700 (1986)). 
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 This reflected the principle that “the Free Exercise Clause is written in terms of 
what the government cannot do to the individual, not in terms of what the individual 
can exact from the government.”86 Moreover, the clause “must apply to all citizens 
alike, and it can give to none of them a veto over public programs that do not prohibit 
the free exercise of religion.”87 Also, unlike Sherbert, which disproportionately 
penalized members of one religion, and Yoder, which compelled Amish parents to 
act contrary to their religious faith, the law in question merely regulated the time and 
place in which all religions could express their faith.   
H. Employment Div. of Oregon v. Smith – Generally Applicable Are 
Valid Despite Modest Interference with Religious Liberty  
In Employment Division of Oregon v. Smith,88 the Court upheld an Oregon law 
prohibiting the use of peyote against the claim of a religious group that used Peyote 
in their religious ceremonies.89 Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia held that 
generally applicable laws do not violate the Free Exercise Clause simply because 
they burden religious practices.90 Justice Scalia also noted that the Court has “never 
held that an individual’s religious beliefs excuse him from compliance with an 
otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate.”91 Indeed, 
“mere possession of religious convictions which contradict the relevant concerns of 
a political society does not relieve the citizen from the discharge of political 
responsibilities.”92 Relying on decades of precedent, Justice Scalia explained that 
“conscientious scruples have not, in the course of the long struggle for religious 
toleration, relieved the individual from obedience to a general law not aimed at the 
promotion or restriction of religious beliefs.”93  
Put differently, religious beliefs do not permit citizens to avoid complying with 
a “valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes 
(or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes).”94 Justice Scalia 
 
 86.  Id. at 451 (quoting Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 412) (Douglas, J., concurring). 
 87.  Id. at 452. The Court stated as follows:  
However much we might wish that it were otherwise, government simply could not operate if it were 
required to satisfy every citizen’s religious needs and desires. A broad range of government 
activities—from social welfare programs to foreign aid to conservation projects—will always be 
considered essential to the spiritual well-being of some citizens, often on the basis of sincerely held 
religious beliefs. Others will find the very same activities deeply offensive, and perhaps 
incompatible with their own search for spiritual fulfillment and with the tenets of their religion . . .  
The Constitution does not, and courts cannot, offer to reconcile the various competing demands on 
government, many of them rooted in sincere religious belief, that inevitably arise in so diverse a 
society as ours. Id. 
 88.  494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 89.  Id. at 874. 
 90.  Id. at 878-89. 
 91.  Id. at 878-79. 
 92.  Id. at 879 (quoting Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 594-595 (1940)). 
 93.  Id. 
 94.  Id. at 879 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 (1982)) (Stevens, J., concurring); see also 
Carol Kaplan, The Devil is in the Details: Neutral, Generally Applicable Laws and Exceptions From Smith, 75 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1045, 1058 (2000). Professor Kaplan states as follows:  
Smith thus paved the way for a paradigmatic shift in the legal and academic discourse about religious 
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noted that the only cases providing exemptions from generally applicable laws “have 
involved not the Free Exercise Clause alone, but the Free Exercise Clause in 
conjunction with other constitutional protections, such as freedom of speech and of 
the press.”95 To be sure, Justice Scalia did not conclude that religious exemptions 
from generally applicable laws were prohibited, and conceded that they may be 
desired.96 The point was simply that such exemptions are not required, and the 
situations in which they should be created was an issue better suited to legislatures, 
not courts.97 
I. Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. Hialeah – Laws May Not Target 
Specific Religions or Religious Practices   
In Church of Lukumi Babalu v. City of Hialeah,98 the Court re-affirmed the 
general principle that states may not, by design or effect, target specific religions or 
religious practices. The ordinance at issue was generally applicable on its face, as it 
banned the “unnecessar[y]” killing of an animal in a public or private ritual or 
ceremony not for the primary purpose of food consumption.99 The petitioners, a 
church practicing the Santeria faith, brought suit claiming that the law infringed on 
its practice of ritual animal sacrifice, and thus disproportionately burdened its free 
 
exercise. Whether intentionally or not, Smith has confounded traditional ways of thinking about 
religion in society, exposing the need for a jurisprudence that equalizes the liberty interests between 
majority and minority religious groups, and between religious and secular groups and individuals. 
 95.  Id. at 881 (citing Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) (invalidating a flat tax on solicitation 
as applied to the dissemination of religious ideas); Follett v. McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944) (same); Pierce 
v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510  (1925) (parents have a fundamental right to direct the upbringing of children); 
Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (invalidating compelled display of a license plate slogan that offended 
individual religious beliefs); West Virginia Bd. of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (invalidating a 
compulsory flag salute statute); see also  Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622  (1984) (“An 
individual’s freedom to speak, to worship, and to petition the government for the redress of grievances could 
not be vigorously protected from interference by the State [if] a correlative freedom to engage in group effort 
toward those ends were not also guaranteed”). 
 96.  Id. at 890. 
 97.  Id.; see also Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court, 85 P.3d 67, 93 (Cal. 2004) (“We 
are unaware of any decision in which . . . [the U.S. Supreme Court] has exempted a religious objector from the 
operation of a neutral, generally applicable law despite the recognition that the requested exemption would 
detrimentally affect the rights of third parties”). In Smith, Justice Scalia stated as follows:  
Values that are protected against government interference through enshrinement in the Bill of Rights 
are not thereby banished from the political process. Just as a society that believes in the negative 
protection accorded to the press by the First Amendment is likely to enact laws that affirmatively 
foster the dissemination of the printed word, so also a society that believes in the negative protection 
accorded to religious belief can be expected to be solicitous of that value in its legislation as well. It 
is therefore not surprising that a number of States have made an exception to their drug laws for 
sacramental peyote use . . . But to say that a nondiscriminatory religious-practice exemption is 
permitted, or even that it is desirable, is not to say that it is constitutionally required, and that the 
appropriate occasions for its creation can be discerned by the courts. It may fairly be said that leaving 
accommodation to the political process will place at a relative disadvantage those religious practices 
that are not widely engaged in; but that unavoidable consequence of democratic government must 
be preferred to a system in which each conscience is a law unto itself or in which judges weigh the 
social importance of all laws against the centrality of all religious beliefs. 494 U.S. at 890. 
 98. 508 U.S. at 520. 
 99.  Id. at 527. 
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exercise rights.100  
The Court agreed and began its analysis by reaffirming Smith and the principle 
that a law “need not be justified by a compelling governmental interest even if the 
law has the incidental effect of burdening a particular religious practice.”101 By the 
same token, “if the object of a law is to infringe upon or restrict practices because of 
their religious motivation, the law is not neutral . . .  and it is invalid unless it is 
justified by a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to advance that interest.”102  
Applying these principles, the Court held that the ordinance impermissibly 
burdened the petitioners’ religious liberty. To begin with, the record revealed that a 
primary objective of the ordinance was “suppression of the central element of the 
Santeria worship service.”103 For example, the inclusion of the words “sacrifice” and 
“ritual” in the ordinance suggested that it targeted the petitioners’ religion.104 
Moreover, the resolution adopting the ordinance included language referring to 
concerns by the community that “certain religions may propose to engage in practices 
which are inconsistent with public morals, peace or safety.”105 Thus, the record 
revealed an improper “attempt to target petitioners and their religious practices”106 
and thereby to achieve a “religious gerrymander.”107 Writing for the majority, 
Justice Kennedy underscored the effects of the ordinance on the petitioners’ religious 
practices:  
The net result of the gerrymander is that few if any killings of animals are 
prohibited other than Santeria sacrifice, which is proscribed because it 
occurs during a ritual or ceremony and its primary purpose is to make an 
offering to the orishas, not food consumption. Indeed, careful drafting 
ensured that, although Santeria sacrifice is prohibited, killings that are no 
more necessary or humane in almost all other circumstances are 
unpunished.108 
 As a result, the ordinance violated the well-settled rule that “[l]egislators may 
not devise mechanisms, overt or disguised, designed to persecute or oppress a 
religion or its practices.”109 
 
 100.  Id. at 520. 
 101.  Id. at 531. 
 102.  Id. at 533. 
 103.  Id. at 534. 
 104.  Id. 
 105.  Id. at 535. 
 106.  Id. 
 107.  Id. (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n of New York City, 397 U.S., 664, 696 (1970)) (Harlan, J., 
concurring). 
 108.  Id. at 536. 
 109.  Id. at 547. In its holding, the Court noted that, “[a]lthough the practice of animal sacrifice may seem 
abhorrent to some, religious beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others in 
order to merit First Amendment protection.” Moreover, “[g]iven the historical association between animal 
sacrifice and religious worship . . . petitioners’ assertion that animal sacrifice is an integral part of their religion 
“cannot be deemed bizarre or incredible,” but rather a sincere expression of their religious beliefs.  Id. at 531. 
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J. City of Boerne v. Flores – Confining the Scope of Federal Power 
City of Boerne v. Flores110 is significant because, after the Court’s ruling in 
Smith, Congress enacted RFRA, which effectively re-instated the Sherbert standard 
and provided greater protections for religious liberty. Under RFRA, laws that 
substantially burden the free exercise of religion must be justified by a compelling 
interest and narrowly tailored to achieve that interest “even if the burden results from 
a rule of general applicability.”111 
In City of Boerne, the Court addressed whether Congress could apply 
RFRA to the states through Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment.  
In a 6-3 decision, the Court answered in the negative, holding that Section 
Five gives Congress “the power ‘to enforce,’ not the power to determine what 
constitutes a constitutional violation.”112 By increasing the government’s burden 
concerning laws impacting religious practices, RFRA altered, not merely enforced, 
the meaning of the Free Exercise Clause.  Put differently, “Congress does not enforce 
a constitutional right by changing what the right is.”113 To be sure, the Court’s 
decision should not be read to suggest that RFRA is unconstitutional. In Gonzales v. 
O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal,114 the Court relied on RFRA to 
hold that the Government’s seizure of a sacramental tea containing a banned 
Schedule I drug violated the free exercise clause.115 Additionally, in response to the 
Boerne ruling, Congress enacted the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized 
Persons Act (RLUIPA), which provides enhanced protections for religious 
landowners and therefore indirectly protects citizens from some state laws that 
substantially burden religion.116 
K. Locke v Davey – States May Disfavor Religious Practices 
In Locke v. Davey,117 the Court held that disfavoring religious practices does not 
amount to impermissibly targeting a specific religion (or religion generally). In a 7-
2 decision, the Court upheld a law that prohibited citizens from receiving state 
financial aid for the purpose of pursuing a degree in theology.118 Writing for the 
majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist explained that nothing in the law “suggests animus 
 
 110.  521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
 111.  42 U.S.C.A. § 2000bb-1 (West 2015). 
 112.  Id.; see also City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519; see also U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 5 (“The Congress 
shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article”).  
 113.  Id. at 519-20 (holding that the “line between measures that remedy or prevent unconstitutional actions 
and measures that make a substantive change” depends on whether there is “congruence and proportionality 
between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end”). 
 114.  546 U.S. 418 (2006). 
 115.  Id. at 439 (holding that the courts below did not err in determining that the Government failed to 
demonstrate, at the preliminary injunction stage, a compelling interest in barring the UDV’s sacramental use 
of hoasca). 
 116.  See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc, et seq. 
 117.  540 U.S. 712 (2004). 
 118.  Id. at 720. 
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toward religion,”119 as the funding exclusion placed “a relatively minor burden”120 
on the petitioner’s religious practices. Justice Roberts noted that “[t]he State’s 
disfavor of religion (if it can be called that) . . . imposes neither criminal nor civil 
sanctions on any type of religious service or rite . . . does not deny to ministers the 
right to participate in the political affairs of the community . . . [a]nd it does not 
require students to choose between their religious beliefs and receiving a government 
benefit.”121 Accordingly, the petitioners’ religion was not “singled out . . . for 
unfavorable treatment,”122 and did not exhibit the type of “hostility toward religion 
which was manifest in Lukumi.”123  
L. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby – Requiring States to Employ the Least 
Restrictive Means When Compelling conduct that Burdens Religious 
Liberty 
 In Burwell v. Hobby Lobby,124 the Court granted a for-profit corporation an 
exemption from a provision in the Affordable Care Act requiring corporations to 
provide health insurance coverage for twenty FDA-approved contraceptive 
methods.125 Several of these methods prevented contraception by blocking a 
fertilized egg from attaching to the uterus.126 The petitioners, who were members of 
several closely held corporations, argued that the coverage was sufficiently 
connected to the destruction of an embryo to constitute a violation of their religious 
beliefs.127   
The Court agreed and held that the law as applied to the corporations violated 
RFRA and the Free Exercise Clause.128 Writing for the majority, Justice Alito 
concluded that a law compelling citizens to provide health insurance coverage for 
contraceptive methods in violation of their religious beliefs constituted a substantial 
burden upon religion.129 Specifically, the law implicated “a difficult and important 
question of religion and moral philosophy, namely, the circumstances under which it 
is wrong for a person to perform an act that is innocent in itself but that has the 
effect of enabling or facilitating the commission of an immoral act by another.”130 
At the same time, as Justice Alito acknowledged, the goal of guaranteeing cost-free 
 
 119.  Id. at 725. 
 120.  Id. 
 121.  Id. at 720-21 (citing McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978)). 
 122.  Id. at 718, 724. 
 123.  Id. at 724. 
 124.  134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
 125.  Id. 
 126.  Id. 
 127.  Id. at 2778 (citing Smith, 494 U.S. at 887) (“[r]epeatedly and in many different contexts, we have 
warned that courts must not presume to determine . . . the plausibility of a religious claim”); Hernandez v. 
Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989); Presbyterian Church in U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial 
Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 450 (1969)). 
 128.  Id. at 2785. 
 129.  Id. at 2777 (rejecting the contention that “the connection between what the objecting parties must do 
(provide health-insurance coverage for four methods of contraception that may operate after the fertilization of 
an egg) and the end that they find to be morally wrong (destruction of an embryo) is simply too attenuated”). 
 130.  Id. at 2778. 
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access to the four challenged contraceptive methods was a compelling governmental 
interest.131   
However, Justice Alito avoided balancing the free exercise claim against the 
government’s interest because the law was not the least restrictive means to achieve 
the government’s objective.  In fact, the government had already established less 
restrictive rules that could have been equally as effective if applied to the 
contraception provision.132 If, for example, an organization certifies that it opposes 
offering health insurance coverage for particular methods of contraception, the 
“organization’s insurance issuer or third-party administrator must ‘[e]xpressly 
exclude contraceptive coverage from the group health insurance coverage provided 
in connection with the group health plan.’”133  In such an instance, the insurance 
issuer pays separately for any covered contraceptive services, without imposing “any 
cost-sharing requirements . . . on the eligible organization, the group health plan, or 
plan participants or beneficiaries.”134 Thus, female employees would retain their 
contraceptive coverage without any additional administrative burdens and 
organizations would not be forced to participate in a practice that violated their 
religious beliefs.135  
Justice Alito’s reasoning suggests that Burwell does not significantly expand 
free exercise rights. Furthermore, Justice Alito intimated that, if the alternative 
accommodation were applied, petitioners’ would not have been able to successfully 
argue that “providing insurance coverage for the contraceptives at issue . . . violates 
their religion.”136 Perhaps most importantly, Justice Alito emphasized the narrowness 
of the Court’s decision: 
We do not hold, as the principal dissent alleges, that for-profit corporations 
and other commercial enterprises can “opt out of any law (saving only tax 
laws) they judge incompatible with their sincerely held religious 
beliefs” . . . Nor do we hold, as the dissent implies, that such corporations 
have free rein to take steps that impose “disadvantages . . . on others” or 
that require “the general public [to] pick up the tab” . . . And we certainly 
do not hold or suggest that “RFRA demands accommodation of a for-profit 
corporation’s religious beliefs no matter the impact that accommodation 
may have on . . . thousands of women employed by Hobby Lobby.”  
As Justice Alito stated, the decision “should not be understood to hold that 
an insurance-coverage mandate must necessarily fall if it conflicts with an 
employer’s religious beliefs.”137  
The cases above underscore the common themes underlying the Court’s 
jurisprudence, some of which focus on whether a law targets or disproportionately 
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impacts a particular religion and others that assess the severity of the interference 
with religious liberty. The case-by-case approach taken by the Court has resulted in 
an unpredictable and largely unprincipled free exercise jurisprudence that has failed 
to strike the proper balance between religious freedom and the government’s interest 
in promoting the public health, safety, and welfare. The contrary outcomes and 
starkly different rationales employed in Sherbert and Smith underscore the  Court’s 
struggle to create a workable standard in free exercise cases. The effect, among 
others, is that the Court’s decisions have not provided meaningful guidance to lower 
federal courts, state and federal legislatures, and citizens concerning the scope and 
meaning of the free exercise clause. As discussed below, the problem is that the 
Court’s decisions are inconsistent with the clause’s purpose and original meaning. 
IV. A FOURTH AMENDMENT PARADIGM THAT EVALUATES FREE EXERCISE OF 
RELIGION CLAIMS BASED ON SOCIETAL, NOT MERELY INDIVIDUAL, 
EXPECTATIONS 
The Court’s free exercise case law affords the highest level of protection to 
religious liberty, regardless of the context. The problem with is that, if a right is given 
such heightened protections in all circumstances, then whatever balancing test the 
Court conducts will disproportionately favor religious liberty because the burden on 
the government in all circumstances will be artificially high. As a result, 
governmental interests that further important societal objectives, and that would be 
upheld under less exacting scrutiny, may be deemed insufficient to justify any 
regulation of religious practices. Put differently, a balancing test is not effective if 
the weight given to an asserted right is so disproportionate that only the most 
compelling governmental interests will sustain laws that impact religious liberty. A 
context-based interpretation would recognize that the right to freely exercise one’s 
religion—like the right to privacy—depends on the circumstances, particularly where 
the assertion of that right impacts the personal liberties of other citizens.   
A. The Assertion of a Constitutionally-Protected Right Must Be 
Objectively Reasonable 
The protections afforded to free exercise rights should not depend merely on 
balancing the individual’s free exercise rights against governmental interests, but on 
a societal expectation about what is—and should be—considered objectively 
reasonable under the circumstances. In recent years, the Court’s free exercise 
jurisprudence has focused solely on the individual’s subjective expectations about 
religious freedom, and not on whether the exercise of this freedom is objectively 
reasonable. To be clear, this does not mean that the sincerity or veracity of a citizen’s 
religious beliefs should be called into question. It means that the Court should 
consider whether society would deem the exercise of those beliefs reasonable based 
on the time and manner in which it is exercised, and the government’s interest in 
protecting public health and welfare.  
This is precisely the approach the Court takes when resolving Fourth 
Amendment disputes, as it considers whether citizens “have a subjective expectation 
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of privacy that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.”138 Specifically, 
“[w]hat is reasonable . . . ‘depends on all of the circumstances surrounding the 
search or seizure and the nature of the search or seizure itself.’”139 In Skinner v. 
Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n,140 the Court relied on factors such as “the intention 
of the Framers of the Fourth Amendment . . .  the uses to which the individual has 
put a location . . . and our societal understanding that certain areas deserve the most 
scrupulous protection from government invasion.”141 These considerations are 
“equally relevant to determining whether the government’s intrusion upon open 
fields without a warrant or probable cause violates reasonable expectations 
of privacy and is therefore a search proscribed by the Amendment.”142 As the Court 
has noted, “reasonableness is still the ultimate standard”143 and requires a “careful 
balancing of governmental and private interests.”144 
In performing this balancing, the Court has developed a three-tiered approach 
that conditions the strength of privacy right on the situation in which it is asserted. In 
Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton,145 the Court stated as follows: 
What expectations are legitimate varies, of course, with context . . .  
depending, for example, upon whether the individual asserting the privacy 
interest is at home, at work, in a car, or in a public park. In addition, the 
legitimacy of certain privacy expectations vis-à-vis the State may depend 
upon the individual’s legal relationship with the State . . . [A]lthough a 
“probationer’s home, like anyone else’s, is protected by the Fourth 
Amendmen[t],” the supervisory relationship between probationer and 
State justifies “a degree of impingement upon [a probationer’s] privacy 
that would not be constitutional if applied to the public at large.”146  
Put simply, “the home does not serve as a bastion of privacy protection that 
secures privacy in other contexts.”147 As discussed below, the Court’s approach 
not only accounts for competing societal interests, but it reflects the original purposes 
and meaning of the Fourth Amendment.148 
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1. Private Areas – The Highest Degree of Fourth Amendment Protection 
Privacy rights receive the highest level of protection in the home, thus prohibiting 
law enforcement from performing searches without probable cause and a warrant. In 
Oliver v. United States,149 the Court justified this approach in light of the original 
purposes of the Fourth Amendment: 
The Amendment reflects the recognition of the Framers that certain 
enclaves should be free from arbitrary government interference. For 
example, the Court since the enactment of the Fourth Amendment has 
stressed “the overriding respect for the sanctity of the home that has been 
embedded in our traditions since the origins of the Republic.”150 
Notwithstanding, the Court has created several exceptions that, even in a private 
residence, will permit law enforcement to conduct a warrantless search.151  
2. Quasi-Public Places—Reduced Evidentiary Burdens on Law Enforcement  
In quasi-public spaces, the Court provides only modest protections for privacy 
rights while simultaneously reducing the evidentiary burden on law enforcement. In 
motor vehicles, for example, individuals may be stopped—and subject to a limited 
search—if officers have reasonable suspicion that the motorist is engaged in criminal 
conduct.152 As the Court stated in New York v. Class,153 “[b]ecause vehicles are 
mobile and subject to pervasive government regulation, an individual’s justifiable 
expectation of privacy in a vehicle is less than in his home.”154 
The same holds true in other quasi-public areas, such as an individual’s place of 
employment. The Court has held that “the privacy interests of government employees 
in their place of work which, while not insubstantial, are far less than those found at 
home or in some other contexts.”155 Thus, when a search is conducted by a 
governmental employer “for a noninvestigatory, work-related purpos[e] or for the 
investigatio[n] of work-related misconduct, a government employer’s warrantless 
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search is reasonable if it is justified at its inception and if the measures adopted are 
reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light 
of’ the circumstances giving rise to the search.”156 Likewise, public school children 
and student athletes have reduced privacy interests based in part on the fact that the 
warrant and probable cause requirements “would unduly interfere with the 
maintenance of the swift and informal disciplinary procedures,”157 or undercut “the 
substantial need of teachers and administrators for freedom to maintain order in the 
schools.”158 
3. Public Areas – No Privacy Protection 
In public areas, citizens have little, if any, Fourth Amendment protection. Thus, 
“an individual may not legitimately demand privacy for activities conducted out of 
doors in fields, except in the area immediately surrounding the home.”159 In Oliver, 
the Court held that such areas did not trigger Fourth Amendment protections or give 
rise to an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy.  Specifically, open fields “do 
not provide the setting for those intimate activities that the Amendment is intended 
to shelter from government interference or surveillance.”160 Moreover, “[t]here is no 
societal interest in protecting the privacy of those activities, such as the cultivation 
of crops, that occur in open fields,”161 as they are “accessible to the public and the 
police in ways that a home, an office, or commercial structure would not be.”162 Put 
simply, Fourth Amendment protections only apply to conduct that significantly 
intrudes upon an individual’s privacy.163  
B. Importing the Fourth Amendment Framework into Free Exercise 
Jurisprudence 
The Court’s Fourth Amendment case law the pragmatic view that “privacy is 
not a discrete commodity, possessed absolutely or not at all”164  When interpreting 
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the Fourth Amendment, the Court has rejected what it has embraced under the free 
exercise clause: case-by-case decision-making that fails to strike a meaningful 
balance between religious liberty and secular governmental interests. In Oliver, the 
Court explained that this approach would not “provide a workable accommodation 
between the needs of law enforcement and the interests protected by 
the Fourth Amendment.”165 Police officers would be required “to guess before 
every search whether landowners had erected fences sufficiently high, posted a 
sufficient number of warning signs, or located contraband in an area sufficiently 
secluded to establish a right of privacy.”166 As such, “[t]he lawfulness of a search 
would turn on “‘[a] highly sophisticated set of rules, qualified by all sorts of ifs, ands, 
and buts and requiring the drawing of subtle nuances and hairline distinctions.’”167  
The Court should adopt a similar approach when interpreting the free exercise 
clause, thus recognizing that religious freedom is inextricably linked to the 
societal contexts in which it is expressed. In fact, several themes have emerged 
from the Court’s free exercise jurisprudence, many of which lay the groundwork for 
developing a more cohesive approach to protecting religious liberty while also 
respecting the government’s authority to advance important state and federal 
interests. The Court’s decisions focus primarily on the following four factors:  
 Whether the law applies in a public, quasi-public, or private area;  
 Whether the law compels or prohibits behavior; 
 Whether the law targets specific religions or practices, or applies equally 
to all citizens; and 
 Whether the law regulates beliefs or practices. 
In cases like Goldman, Lyng, and Smith, the Court relied in part on these factors 
to uphold laws that interfered with religious liberty. As evident in Burwell, however, 
the Court has not always embraced this interpretation of the free exercise clause and 
the result has been a muddled jurisprudence under the free exercise clause.  
As discussed below, the Court can bring cohesion to free exercise disputes by 
adopting the approach used in Fourth Amendment cases, where factors such as the 
place in which the privacy interest is asserted, the items or objects 
searched, and the countervailing needs of law enforcement, determine the 
strength of a privacy claim and the burdens on law enforcement. Simply 
put, the higher a privacy valuation, the higher the burden on law 
enforcement. This approach has resulted in principled, albeit imperfect, 
distinctions between private, quasi-public, and public space, and reflect pragmatic 
considerations to ensure that law enforcement investigatory authority is not frustrated 
by unrealistic standards. For example, Fourth Amendment protections apply with less 
force when “special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the 
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warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable.’”168  In such 
circumstances, “balance[s] the governmental and privacy interests to assess the 
practicality of the warrant and probable-cause requirements in the particular 
context.”169 Furthermore, the government’s interest in warrantless searches is most 
compelling when the “the burden of obtaining a warrant is likely to frustrate the 
governmental purpose behind the search.”170 
Practicality and purpose are precisely what the Court’s free exercise 
jurisprudence lacks. The Court assesses a law interfering with free exercise rights by 
examining its effect on religious beliefs and practices, but the determination of 
whether an effect is incidental or substantial depends on the degree to which that right 
is protected in a given context.  For example, when interpreting the Fourth 
Amendment, the Court has held that law enforcement need only have reasonable 
suspicion before stopping a motorist because the right to privacy is reduced in quasi-
public spaces, thus rendering the interference with a motorist’s privacy less 
substantial. At the same time, law enforcement could never search a home with 
merely reasonable suspicion because privacy rights engender more protections in 
private spaces. This approach inherently—and effectively—balances privacy rights 
against the societal interests in crime prevention and public safety. In free exercise 
cases, there is no valuation of religious liberty, which has led the Court to invalidate 
laws that advance important government interests and that place little, if any, burden 
on an individual’s religious beliefs or practices.   
This was exemplified in Burwell, when the Court exempted a closely-held 
corporation from a law that had no impact on the petitioners’ right to freely exercise 
their religion, advanced compelling governmental interests, and applied only to 
public entities that were responsible for providing their employees with health 
insurance. If this approach were used when deciding Fourth Amendment disputes, 
such that any infringements on privacy always required probable cause and a warrant, 
then law enforcement’s ability to prevent and investigate criminal conduct would be 
severely undermined. That, in a nutshell, is the point.  
The above discussion is not meant to suggest that there are no similarities in the 
adjudication of Fourth Amendment and free exercise cases. In both areas, the Court 
conducts a balancing test that weighs individual rights against societal and 
governmental interests. The difference is that an individual’s right to privacy is not 
given the highest levels of protection in all contexts.171  This is not true, or is less 
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true, when free exercise disputes arise.  In the Fourth Amendment context, it would 
be akin to affording privacy the highest level of protection regardless of whether a 
citizen is sleeping at home, driving a car, or standing in an open field. Not 
surprisingly, this is precisely the problem that has occurred in recent free exercise 
cases. The heightened protection afforded to religious liberty in all cases requires the 
government to satisfy strict scrutiny, even where the law at issue applies only in 
public spaces and neither compels nor prohibits an individual from practicing their 
religious faith or expressing their beliefs.172 The result has been an over-protection 
of religious liberty and an under-valuing of all citizens’ right to equal and non-
discriminatory treatment in the public domain. Unfortunately, a skewed balancing 
test produces unjust outcomes, as the Court’s decision in Hobby Lobby 
demonstrated.  
The Table below offers a new interpretive model to more effectively balance 
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Table III 
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Ultimately, the First Congress drafted the free exercise clause with a view that 
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liberty cannot be fully realized if the government adopts a position or endorses a 
particular view on matters of personal conscience and faith. When government 
expresses a preference, however slight, for certain religions or religious practices, 
citizens are implicitly discouraged from developing their own. The Court’s recent 
decisions do not reflect the purpose and meaning of the free exercise clause, 
which was to protect religion against governmental persecution or 
coercion, not to permit individual religious beliefs to trump laws 
advancing the collective interests of all citizens. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Constitutional rights are not absolute rights, and the free exercise of religion is 
no more sacred than an individual’s right to be free from unreasonable searches and 
seizures. The best approach is to recognize that the right to freely exercise 
one’s religion is, at its core, a guarantee of personal autonomy. It is a 
promise that the government will neither endorse nor punish citizens for 
exercising their religious beliefs, but instead cultivate a climate where 
citizens of diverse backgrounds can express and practice their beliefs while 
being treated equally under the law. At the same time, the free exercise 
clause does not absolve citizens of the responsibility to comply with laws 
that advance the collective interests of all citizens, neither punish nor target 
specific religions, and prohibit rather than compel conduct that, in itself, is 
purely secular. Simply stated, the free exercise clause is a shield against 
government coercion, not a license for individuals to avoid complying 
with laws that advance important societal interests and promote equality 
for all citizens. 
 
 
 
